Außenminister redet Unfug

Der israelische Außenminister Silvan Schalom (=schöner Name) erklärte heute gegenüber dem israelischen Armeerundfunk in traditioneller und längst gescheiterter Manier: "Wenn die Terrorwelle gegen israelische Bürger andauere, wird Israel nicht über die so genannte Roadmap verhandeln."

Solche Erklärungen taugen allenfalls zur Anstiftung zum Terrorismus, denn so wissen Terroristen, dass sie die Geschicke der Politik beeinflussen können.

Am Sonntagabend hatte ein 25-jähriger Palästinenser auf einem Busbahnhof ein Selbstmordattentat verübt und fünfzig Menschen verletzt. Mindestens zwei von ihnen schwer.

Im Nachhinein kam es zu den typischen Reaktionen diverser Extremistenorganisationen, die sich zu dem Anschlag "bekannten", aber nicht dafür haften möchten.
Angeblich ließ die Gruppierung "Islamischer Dschihad" verlautbaren, dass der Anschlag als "Antwort auf israelische Massaker an Palästinensern" zu interpretieren sei. Am mit Israel vereinbarten Waffenstillstand wolle man jedoch festhalten. - Schizophrener kann die Erklärung nicht sein und kommt an dem Fakt nicht vorbei, dass es für Attentate gegen Zivilisten keine auch nur irgendwie akzeptable "Erklärung" geben kann.

-sven-

Irrsinn von Schuldzuweisungen

Im Süden Israels sprengte sich ein extremistischer Palästinenser in die Luft und verletzte 40 Zivilisten.
Sogleich geht das populistische Geschäft gegenseitiger Schuldzuweisungen los:

- der israelische Regierungssprecher Avi Pasner erklärte den Anschlag als "Ergebnis der Passivität der palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde",

- der nationale Sicherheitsberater von Präsident Abbas, Dschibril Radschub, verstieg sich zu der Behauptung, dass Israel die Folgen seines "Verbrechens in Tulkarem habe erwarten können".

Zwar ließen es die beiden Politiker nicht an "Verurteilungen des Terrorismus" fehlen, aber durch die Schuldzuweisungen verschaffen sie dem Terrorismus die Legitimation aus dem Versagen der Gegenseite. - So bekommt man den Terrorismus nicht weg.

-sven-

DER ABZUG

Reale Schritte zum Frieden

Nach 38 Jahren hat nun tatsächlich der Abzug israelischer Siedler aus den Palästinenser-Gebieten begonnen.

Wem dazu kein besser Kommentar einfällt als: "Das reicht nicht!", hat zwar recht, weil der Weg zu Frieden und Aussöhnung nach so viel Krieg lang ist, aber redet den wichtigsten Schritt klein, redet ohne Verstand oder in schlechter Absicht.

Frieden hätte sogar dann möglich müssen, wenn die Siedler geblieben wären. Allerdings schwieriger. Und darum ist dieser Schritt so besonders zu begrüßen.

Wenn den Politikern der Welt für dieses Jahr nicht noch Bedeutenderes für den Weltfrieden einfällt - und wenn Scharon diesen Schritt nicht rückgängig macht, dann sollten wir ihn und diejenigen, die diesen schweren Schritt für den Frieden gehen, ehren.

Grüße von Sven >> DISKUSSION
Berlin, 17. August 2005

Arte-Reportage zum israelischen Mauerbau

Die Arte-Reportage "Mit offenen Karten - Israel - Palästina - Sicherheitzaun" (2004) zeichnet den Verlauf der israelischen Mauerbaus bzw. Zaunbaus im israelisch-palästinensischen Grenzgebiet nach. Hauptbedeutsam für völkerrechtliche Beurteilung dürfte sein, dass der Mauerbau ausschließlich auf palästinensischem Gebiet erfolgt und durch großräumige Einbeziehung israelischer Siedlungen weiteres Palästinensergebiet okkupiert und teilt, so dass große Palästinenser-Ortschaften vollständig vom palästinensischen Hinterland abgetrennt wurden. Desgleichen passiert mit Ost-Jerusalem.

http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=xp_4zkuwozI

Kommentar: Die Baumaßnahmen werden damit begründet, sie würden das Eindringen palästinensischer Selbstmordattentäter hindern, aber selbst wenn zu solchen Sicherheitsmaßnahmen ein Mauerbau richtig wäre, dann nur innerhalb der anerkannten Grenzen Israels und nicht als Landnahme auf Palästinensergebiet.

markus rabanus >> www.Diskussionen.de

CHRONIK-Vermerk: Die Arte-Reportage entstand 2004, also vor dem Abzug der israelischen Siedlungen im Gaza-Streifen. Deshalb Posting-Rückdatierung des Postings auf Dezember 2004.

verbesserter Nahost-Friedensplan

iNiDiA.de "Arabisch-Israelische Liga"
als Alternative zur "Roadmap" und anderen Friedensplänen

7-Etappen-Plan
sven translation ERGÄNZEN
vom 04/2003 überarbeitet 12/2004

1. Etappe:
Der UN-Sicherheitsrat veranlasst die Israelis, Palästinenser und Araber in beliebiger Reihenfolge zu Erklärungen, in denen gegenüber der Weltorganisation die Einsicht bekundet wird, a) dass es wirklichen Frieden nicht gegeneinander, sondern nur im regionalen Miteinander geben kann, b) dass die Verhandlungen nicht von "Vorbedingungen" abhängig sein dürfen, die allenfalls im Friedensprozess Ergebnis sein können: "Ende des Terrors, Ende der Besatzung und Siedlungspolitik, ..." KLICK

2. Etappe:
Der UN-Sicherheitsrat gründet eine Arabisch-Israelischen Liga, deren vordringlichste Aufgabe ein System kollektiver Sicherheitsgarantien ist.

3. Etappe:
Stationierung von Polizei-Truppen der Arabischen Liga und der Vereinten Nationen in den Palästinenser-Gebieten zur Terrorbekämpfung und Reorganisation der palästinensischen Selbstverwaltung.

4. Etappe:
Erst dann Rückzug der israelischen Armee aus den Palästinenser-Gebieten.

5. Etappe:
Hinsichtlich der israelischen Siedlungen gibt es vier Alternativen: 1. entweder Übergabe oder 2. Gebietstausch, 3. doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft oder 4. den Streitparteien fiele etwas Besseres ein.

6. Etappe:
Multikulturelle Reformierung der Staatsziele sowohl Israels als auch des künftigen Palästinenserstaates und Jerusalems, geteilt oder mit Sonderstatus.

7. Etappe:
Gründung des Palästinenser-Staates und dessen Aufnahme in das System Kollektiver Sicherheit der Arabisch-Israelischen Liga.

Nahost-Konflikt DISKUSSION

"Vorsicht! Friedman" - in alter Spur

Michel Friedman, Ex-Vizepräsident des Zentralrates und Befürworter des Irak-Kriegs Teil 2 nutzt den Tod von Arafat zum Come Back. Gleich mehrere Interviews, in denen der noch vor wenigen Monaten selbst wegen Drogenmissbrauchs Verurteilte nicht mit Verurteilungen gegen Arafat spart. Und in der BILD-Zeitung, dem passenden Organ für alles Törichte, verbreitet Friedman folgendes Nahost-Verständnis als NACHRUF an die Adresse des toten Friedensnobelpreisträgers: "Sie sind kein Märtyrer, Sie sind ein Mörder. Sie waren nichts anderes als ein Verbrecher! Sie waren durch und durch korrupt. Ihr Volk hungerte, während Ihre Familie in Paris in Saus und Braus lebte. ..." - Fast wäre vergessen, dass Friedman mit Export-Prostituierten aus Osteuropa im Nobelhotel erwischt wurde. Er war und ist der richtige Mann in allen moralischen Fragen. Die Paragraphen 188, 189 StGB kennt Friedman wohl nicht oder schützen ihm keine Palästinenser.
Es ist dieses Gespann unverantwortlicher Scharfmacherei, in dem Friedman und BILD zusammenwirken. Die BILD, die unlängst die Queen mit dem Vorwurf brüskierte, dass wegen Dresden noch offene Rechnung sei, wenngleich im Kleingedruckten das Gegenteil gestanden haben könnte, aber der Titel machte Auflage und Stimmung. Und Friedman? Er macht alle zu Lügnern, die sagen, dass Juden nicht Juden schaden könnten, was ohnehin Unsinn ist, denn das ist es gerade, dass einem die eigenen Leute Schaden anrichten, wenn man es zulässt und nicht wahrhaben will. Das ist sein einziger Verdienst und daraus ist sein Verdienst. Wahrscheinlich sitzt er noch immer im Beirat der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik und untergräbt ohne Skrupel die Sicherheit, denn sein Geschimpfe gegen Arafat ist, als wenn es in Deutschland an arabischer Feindschaft gegen Israel und die Juden fehlt. Wer zahlt die Rechnung für solches Tun? Er hoffentlich nicht, aber hoffentlich auch nicht die Synagogen. -sven-

Die falschen Friedensengel

Während oder weil der Irak in Anarchie verkommt, ist Blair zur Zeit in Washington und arbeitete angeblich mit Bush einen neuen Nahost-Friedensplan aus.
Medien berichten, dass dieser Plan bis 2009 einen Palästinenserstaat vorsehe.
Der Plan solle aber vor seiner Veröffentlichung mit den Beteiligten in Nahost beredet werden. - Die Hoffnung stirbt zuletzt. Aber wer nur hofft und nichts dafür tut, hat weniger Grund zu Hoffnung, insbesondere bei Bush, Blair, Scharon und vorerst schwach aussehender Führung der Palästinenser. -msr-

Arafats Begräbnis und nun?

Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer verpasste die gigantische Trauerzeremonie in Kairo. Sein Flugzeug kam nicht aus den Wolken, so viele Flugzeuge landeten zum Abschied des prominentesten Arabers der Neuzeit.

Dann folgte die Überführung Arafats nach Ramallah. Der Hubschrauber landete im Gewühl der Menschenmassen, mühsam arbeiteten sich die Sargträger zum zerbombten Amtssitz des verstorbenden PLO-Chefs. Menschen klettern die Ruinen hoch, stürzten ab. Chaos, doch immerhin ohne Tote.

Was zeigten die Bilder?

Mir zeigten sie, dass Arafat größeren Rückhalt in der Bevölkerung hatte, als ich ihm noch zugetraut hatte. Oder ist es die Angst der Palästinenser, dass ihre Gesellschaft nun noch mehr in die Anarchie abrutscht? Ist es Angst vor den Extremisten? Ist es Angst davor, dass sie niemanden mehr haben, dessen Stimme in der Welt Gewicht hat, wenngleich sie Bush und Sharon nichts mehr galt?

Mir zeigten die Bilder, wie tief zerstört der Frieden ist, dass so viele Menschen in Jammer fallen, obwohl Arafat doch auf keinen Fall unumstritten war.

Arafats vergiftetes Testament

Und tat er den Palästinensern einen Gefallen, wenn er auf dem Tempelberg beerdigt werden wollte? Mit Sicherheit nicht, denn solches Testament wird weitere Leben kosten. Auf dem Tempelberg ein Grab beanspruchen. - Niemand gehört dort begraben und niemand sollte dort töten und umkommen dürfen. Wie vermessen ist sein Wunsch und trauriger Beleg für die Mischung aus gnadenlosem Populismus und Egoismus, aus der noch immer viele Politiker ihr Charisma beziehen.

Arafat gelang im Leben nicht, was er nun auch noch über seinen Tod als Misslingen fortsetzt: Frieden den Israelis und dem palästinensischen Volk. Terroristen können sich auf ihn berufen, tun es schon und werden weiter morden.

Ich hätte von Arafat für sein Testament gefordert: "Das Töten muss aufhören." Als letztem Wunsch eines Mannes, der den Friedensnobelpreis erhielt.

Und trotzdem ist das nur die halbe Wahrheit, denn so unweise sein Leben und Testament war, wäre Arafat weit lieber über Rote Teppiche in kleinstem Palästinenserstaat gegangen als in seinem zerbombten Hauptquartier über Jahre gefangen zu sein. Das wurde ignoriert und anstatt mit ihm zu verhandeln, wurde er isoliert, um genau das zu tun, was Leute vom Schlage Scharons gar nicht anders können: dem Gegner maximal zu schaden.

Israels Versagen:

Scharon Israel hat Anteil daran, dass die Palästinenser entmündigt sind. Für Scharons September-Spaziergang auf den Tempelberg war längst nicht die Zeit gekommen und er wusste um die Provokation und wollte die Folgen für Ehud Barak. Dieser Spaziergang ist Scharon nicht zu verzeihen, auch nicht dadurch, dass seine Provokation niemals Rechtfertigung sein kann für die Intifada oder den palästinensischen Terrorismus.

Die Israelis müssen überlegen, wenn sie nicht selbst von jener Blindheit sein wollen, die sie den Palästinensern fortlaufend vorwerfen. Die Israelis müssen überlegen, ob sie mit Scharon gut beraten sind, denn solch Mann wie er hat keinen Willen zum Frieden. Sein ganzes Leben war Krieg und schon seine Wahl zum Regierungschef war die ungeheuerlichste Provokation Israels gegen die Palästinenser, denn nach Sabra und Schatila hätte ein solcher Mann nicht nur sein Ministeramt verlieren müssen, sondern auch jedes Recht auf Rückkehr in die Politik.

Der Krieg verdirbt alles, verdirbt alle Kultur. Es gibt keinen "Krieg gegen den Terrorismus", der nicht zugleich Krieg gegen die Zivilisten wäre und daraus ist nicht nur die Logik der Hauszerstörungen, sondern das gesamte Besatzungsregime, das weder wirklich endet noch richtig Stellung bezieht, sondern im permanenten Vor und Zurück wie eine Beatmung für den palästinensischen Terrorismus ist und zugleich wieder auch für die Macht von Scharon, denn ohne den palästinensischen Terrorismus hätten ihn die Israelis längst aus dem Amt gejagt.

Wirkung von Terrorismus und Krieg

Der Terrorismus und der Krieg verderben die politische Kultur, gewinnt Wahlen in den USA und zerstört das Völkerrecht, wenn nicht die Menschen endlich abrechnen, wie sehr die Gewalt gegen die Gewalt versagt, wenn sie sich selbst dem Recht entzieht.

WAS IST ZU TUN?

Was ist zu tun? >> Das Kriegsrecht muss der Politik verweigert werden und dafür reicht die Kriegsdienstverweigerung nicht, sondern es braucht die Anklage gegen jeden, der Gewalt gegen andere anwendet, ohne dass Notwehr und Nothilfe besteht. Und wenn die Terroristen oder Politikverbrecher nicht zu fassen sind, dann sind sie nicht zu fassen und rechtfertigen nicht, die Menschenmassen in Mitleidenschaft zu ziehen.

Was ist zu tun? >> Dann nehmt die Bomber und werft Flugblätter ab, in denen die Argumente für den Frieden besser sind als die für den Terrorismus. Und wenn Worte nicht reichen, weil sie zerschlissen sind, dann werft anderes ab, aber werft keine Bomben. So viele sind tot. Der extremistische Mullah samt Begleitern von Raketen getötet und die Dummheit triumphierte, dass er nun in Stücke gerissen seinen Jungfrauen im Himmel begegne. Arafat galt nicht zufällig denen als Hindernis für den Frieden, die selbst immer die gewalttätigste Politik betreiben. Nun ist auch dieses "Hindernis" tot. Was nun, Herr Scharon?

Die Politik der starken Worte, die gar nicht stark sind, sondern nur brutal, die Politik der brutalen Worte hat versagt wie auch die Politik der Gewalt versagt hat.

Gemeinsamkeit von Terrorismus und Krieg

Versagen auf allen Seiten: Gewalt sucht den Feind immer an seinen verletzlichen Stellen, ansonsten gäbe es keine Gewalt. Und wie die Terroristen versuchen, die israelische Politik durch Terrorismus gegen Schulkinder zu erpressen, so versucht Scharon mit Baggern und Panzern die Palästinenser zu erpressen, dass sie sich gegen die Terroristen erheben, aber die Opfer auf beiden Seiten verbünden sich in all dieser Gewalt mit genau den schlimmsten Schlächtern, die sie gegen die andere Seite aufzubieten haben. - Das ist der Fehler. Es gibt keinen Zweifel, dass dieser Fehler auf beiden Seiten ist.

Und dagegen braucht es Kampagne.

-sven-

Arafat ist tot 11.11.2004

Jassir Arafat verstarb vergangene Nacht um 03.30 Uhr.

Die Todesursache sei ungeklärt, was Spekulationen unnötig Raum gibt, denn es ist nach Ansicht von Medizinern undenkbar, dass die Erkrankung nicht diagnostiziert worden sei.
Arafat soll nun von Paris nach Kairo überführt werden. Dort sind für den kommenden Freitag Trauerfeierlichkeiten angekündigt, an der zahlreiche Politiker teilnehmen werden. Aus der Ranghöhe der Delegationen lassen sich indes nicht jeden Rückschluss zu, welche Aufmerksamkeit einerseits Arafat in seinen vielen Funktionen und Lebensstationen samt Friedensnobelpreis dargebracht wird, andererseits dem Nahost-Konflikt an sich.

Die nachstehende Liste ist noch unvollständig:

Ägypten: Präsident Husni Mubarak
Algerien: PräsidentAbdelaziz Bouteflika
Belgien: Außenminister Karel De Gucht
Dänemark: Außenminister Per Stig Moeller
Deutschland: Außenminister Joschka Fischer
EU: Außenpolitischer Repräsentant Javier Solana
EU-Kommission: Forschungskommissar Louis Michel
Finnland: Außenminister Erkki Tuomioja
Frankreich: Außenminister Michel Barnier
Griechenland: Außenminister Petros Moliviatis
Großbritannien: Außenminister Jack Straw
Indien: Außenminister Natwar Singh
Indonesien: Präsident Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
Iran: Außenminister Kamal Charrasi
Italien: Staatssekretär Alfredo Mantica
Jemen: Präsident Ali Abdullah Saleh
Jordanien: König Abdullah II.
Libanon: Präsident Emile Lahud
Luxemburg: Außenminister Jean Asselborn
Malaysia: Ministerpräsident Abdullah Ahmad Badawi
Niederlande: Außenminister Ben Bot
Norwegen: Außenminister Jan Petersen
Österreich: Vizekanzler Hubert Gorbach
Pakistan: Ministerpräsident Shaukat Aziz
Portugal: Außenminister Antonio Monteiro
Schweiz: Außenministerin Micheline Calmy-Rey
Somalia: Präsident Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed
Spanien: Außenminister Miguel Angel Moratinos
Südafrika: Präsident Thabo Mbeki
Sudan: Präsident Omar el Baschir
Tunesien: Präsident Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
Türkei: Ministerpräsident Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Ungarn: Außenminister Ferenc Somogyi
USA: Unterstaatssekretär William Burns
Zypern: Außenminister George Iacovou

Die Beerdigung soll in Ramallah folgen.

Die Nachfolge Arafats ist zwischenzeitlich geregelt: Die PLO wählte den früheren Ministerpräsident Mahmud Abbas in den Vorsitz. Zum Interimspräsidenten der Autonomiebehörde wurde Parlamentspräsident Rauhi Fattuh vereidigt.

Israels Premier Ariel Scharon signalisierte, dass nun wieder mit den Palästinensern verhandelt werden könne.

Auch US-Präsident Bush brachte die Hoffnung zum Ausdruck, dass es mit dem Friedensprozess Fortschritte geben könne, steht aber gleichzeitig vor dem Dilemma, dass jede us-amerikanische Annäherung an einen palästinensischen Politiker dessen Sturz bedeuten könnte, denn das Ansehen der USA fiel seit dem Irak-Krieg auf einem Tiefpunkt.

Unterdessen wurden bei einem israelischen Militäreinsatz im Gaza-Streifen drei Palästinenser erschossen und mindestens neun verletzt. Zwei der Erschossenen hätten versucht Raketen auf eine israelische Siedlung abzufeuern.

-sven-

Ob Arafat noch lebt?

Verfasst am: 09.11.2004 20:12 im Forum
Nach übereinstimmenden Meldungen der Nachrichtenagenturen einigten sich die israelische Regierung und die palästinensische Autonomiebehörde über die Beerdigungsmodalitäten für den Fall seines Ablebens. Als wahrscheinlich gilt, dass Arafat in seinem Ramallah-Hauptquartier bestattet wird. Arafat befindet sich noch immer in einem Pariser Militärhospital. Zu seinem Gesundheitszustand enthält sich die französische Regierung jeglichen Kommentars. Am 4.11. war der Palästinenserpräsident mehrfach für tot erklärt worden, was immer wieder dementiert wurde. Pressesprecher des Krankenhauses beschrieben seine gesundheitliche Situation als "stabil". Ob er noch lebt oder in einem irreversiblen Koma liegt, ist unklar.

Wahrheit, Gerücht, Verleumdung?

T-Online verbreitet aus einem Gespräch mit dem Nahost-Korrespondent Ulrich Sahm folgende Nachricht:
"Offenbar geht es bei dem Streit um viel Geld: Arafat habe einen großen Teil der von der EU und anderen Organisationen gespendeten Gelder auf Privatkonten in Paris deponiert ... Da Arafat vermutlich kein Testament gemacht hat, wäre Suha nach seinem Tod die rechtmäßige und alleinige Erbin des palästinensischen Vermögens. Die zukünftige Witwe sei eine Verbrecherin, zitierte Sahm den Weggefährten Arafats, Imad Schakur."
Nun fragt sich noch, wer sich da auf das Bankgeheimnis verlässt: Jassir Arafat oder Ulrich Sahm?

Arafats langes Sterben

So wie sein Leben war, so auch sein Tod. Jassir Arafat. Geboren mal dort, mal woanders. Viel Geheimnis, um in all seinen Stationen einer von denen zu sein, deren Gefolgschaft er suchte. Seit Stunden widersprüchliche Nachrichten. Hirntod, Koma, vielleicht ist er längst tot und darf in den Meldungen nicht sterben, solange nicht die Thronfolge steht. Die palästinensische Zukunft nach Arafat ist schlecht geordnet, zu sehr vertraute der PLO-Chef nur sich, stets umgeben von Leibwächtern, die nicht immer nur Statussymbol waren, sondern gebraucht in der Konkurrenz unfriedlicher Macht.

Mir ist weh um ihn, denn so schwierig seine Biographie, steht er doch auch für die Unzulänglichkeit des Menschen und der Politik daraus. Und wer es bessern will, kann es nicht ohne es mit den Menschen zu üben, die in der Politik sind. Es war 1983 in Prag, als Arafat überraschend auf dem Weltfriedenskongress auftrat. Wieder mit seinen Leibwächtern, was an diesem Ort nicht nötig war. Er hielt die Rede in seiner Art, aber in wichtigen Fragen des Nahen Ostens war schon die Wende in den Worten. Ich trat auf ihn zu, umarmte ihn, wünschte ihm langes Leben und Frieden mit all seinen Feinden, weil es der einzig wahre Sieg ist.

Sein Leben scheint zu Ende. Unerreicht das versprochene Ziel.
Friede seinem Andenken.

-sven.

Terror, Gegenterror, Terror, ...

Die palästinensische Extremistenorganisation "Volksfront für die Befreiung Palästinas" (PFLP) soll sich zu dem Selbstmordattentat eines 16-Jährigen "bekannt" haben, bei dem auf einem Marktplatz in Tel Aviv drei Israelis getötet und 32 weitere verletzt wurden.

Die PFLP will also nicht nur für Morde an unschuldigen Zivilisten verantwortlich sein, sondern auch für den Einsatz von Minderjährigen im Morden. Jeglicher Einsatz von Kindersoldaten ist Ausdruck äußerster Perversion und straft jene Lügen, die durch absurde NS-Vergleiche gegen die israelische Regierung von Totalversagen auf Seiten der Palästinenser ablenken wollen.

Und dennoch lässt die israelische Regierung keine Gelegenheit aus, ihre eigene Unfähigkeit in diesem Konflikt andauern zu lassen. Sie rächte den Anschlag durch Abriss des Hauses, in dem der Attentäter gelebt hatte sowie zwei weiterer Häuser mutmaßlicher Drahtzieher. Der jugendliche Attentäter stammte aus dem Flüchtlingslager Askar bei Nablus.

Solche Abrissaktionen werden regelmäßig als "Vergeltungsaktionen" bezeichnet, dürften aber oft unschuldige Menschen treffen, wodurch sich das Gewaltpotential vergrößert.
Die israelische Regierung verkennt zu Lasten der Sicherheit in Israel und in den besetzten Gebieten, dass sie den Terroristen in die Hände spielt.

Wenn die Palästinensergebiete Hort von Terroristen sind, dann gibt es zur geordneten Besatzung und ordentlichen Gerichtsverfahren keine Alternative, aber Terroristen bekämpfen zu wollen, indem man sich mit ihnen auf die "Sprache der Gewalt" ohne Rücksicht auf Unschuldige einlässt, ist die verkehrteste Politik überhaupt, denn tatsächlich: in der Politik gibt es nicht nur "falsch" und "richtig", sondern es lässt unermesslich steigern, was im Falsch-Bereich nur leider erheblich einfacher fällt.

-msr- >> Diskussion

Nahost-Friedensplan iNiDiA.de

als Alternative zur "Roadmap" und anderen Friedensplänen

7-Etappen-Plan vom 09.04.2003
sven translation ERGÄNZEN


Problem:
- Israelis und Palästinenser schaffen den Frieden nicht aus eigener Kraft,
- dem Nahen Osten kann der Frieden nicht übergestülpt werden,
- die Region muss sich neu und kollektiv organisieren: KLICK

1. Etappe:
Der UN-Sicherheitsrat gründet eine Arabisch-Israelische Liga, deren Hauptaufgabe ein System Kollektiver Sicherheitsgarantien ist.

2. Etappe:
Stationierung von Polizei-Truppen der Arabischen Liga und der Vereinten Nationen in den Palästinenser-Gebieten zur Terrorbekämpfung.

3. Etappe:
Erst dann Rückzug der israelischen Armee aus den Palästinenser-Gebieten.

4. Etappe:
Reorganisation der palästinensischen Selbstverwaltung.

5. Etappe:
Hinsichtlich der israelischen Siedlungen gibt es vier Alternativen:
a) entweder Abriss oder
b) Gebietstausch,
c) juristische Integration in den Palästinenser-Staat oder
d) den Streitparteien fiele etwas Besseres ein.

6. Etappe:
Multikulturelle Reformierung der Staatsziele sowohl Israels als auch des künftigen Palästinenserstaates und Jerusalems mit regelungsbedürftigem Sonderstatus.

7. Etappe:
Gründung des Palästinenser-Staates und dessen Aufnahme in das System Kollektiver Sicherheit der Arabisch-Israelischen Liga.

Nahost-Konflikt DIALOG-LEXIKON

projektbeschreibung

www.inidia.de/nahost.htm bringt die Stichworte und älteren Stellungnahmen.

Sollten sich neue Dinge ergeben, werden wir sie in diesem Blog kundtun.
redaktion www.final.de

Verfasst am: 15.07.2004 09:11

Titel: Die Diplomatie darf nicht wegen Terrors pausieren!

aus Privatkorrespondenz:

Guten Morgen!!

Mit dem Frieden im Nahen Osten kann ich und möchte ich über die prinzipillen Sachen hinaus gar nicht ins Detail gehen. Jeden Tag passiert dort Politik, die gegen meine Forderungen geht.

Die erste davon lautet, dass sich die Verhandlungen nicht durch Bomben und Gegengewalt aufhalten lassen dürfen.
Ein "erst müsst Ihr dies und das" ist fruchtlos und belässt die Initiative bei den Gewalttätern.

Ich werde diese Dialogforderung in den "Nahost-Friedensplan" vorwegstellen, den ich in den weiteren Grundgedanken für richtig halte, weil er die Israelis nicht aus den besetzten Gebieten verbannt, ehe dort nicht Ordnung gegen die Israel-Vernichter herrscht.

Streiten will ich mich mit Dir über Israel nie wieder, weil:

1. haben wir beiden den Unfrieden dort nicht gemacht - und das ist wirklich ein wichtiger Grund,

2. fragt uns weder ein Bombenleger noch ein israelischer Politiker, was er tun darf - auch das ist ein wichtiger Grund, dass wir uns nicht streiten, wo uns niemand mitsprechen lässt, aber trotzdem unsere Gefolgschaft fordert und nennt das "Solidarität",

3. wird an mich fortlaufend Streit von solchen Leuten herangetragen, von denen die einen extrem nur die Pali-Interessen sehen und die anderen nur die Israeli-Interessen, aber
a) führen solche einseitigen Interessenwahrnehmungen nicht zum Frieden zwischen Palis und Israelis,
b) ändert sich durch Details und Tagesnachrichten im Konflikt nichts an den Prinzipien,
c) wird der Konflikt nicht dadurch kleiner, dass sich die Welt an ihm in zwei Lager spaltet, sondern nur dadurch, dass eine möglichst große und ungespaltene Welt klar und deutlich sagt: "Verhandelt, so viel sich erreichen lässt und verhandelt trotzdem, auch wenn es Gewalttäter gibt, ansonsten seid ihr deren Geisel."

Ich bin so absolut überzeugt von der Notwendigkeit des diplomatischen Verkehrs (also des Dialogs), dass mir jede Unterbrechung des Dialogs als eine Unterstützung des Terrors gilt: Solange sich die Politiker durch den Terror die Politik unterbrechen lassen, geben sie dem Terror "Sinn" über das Morden hinaus, machen also ihre Politik "mit dem Terrorismus" bzw. "mit der Gewalt". Und ich werde mich nicht davon täuschen lassen, dass sie "den Terror verurteilen", denn sie überlassen ihm die Initiative.

Was zu tun ist mit den "Friedenshindernissen", z.B. Siedlungen, Terror usw.:

1. Es sind Verletzungen des Friedens, aber "Friedenshindernisse" sind es nicht, denn auch, dass sie sich gegenseitig zur Begründung nehmen, ist kein mich überzeugender Zusammenhang. Feststeht mindestens, dass die Siedlungen den Terror nicht aus dem Konflikt schaffen und der Terror nicht die Siedlungen beseitigen wird. 2. Die Verhandler sollen sich die Handlungen der anderen Seite, auf die sie sich nicht verständigen können, zwei getrennte Bücher führen. Die scharfen Hunde beider Seiten können und werden derweil ihre Politik der Gewalt und Gegengewalt weitermachen, solange keine Ordnung ist, die sie daran hindert.

3. Aber neben den beiden "Sündenregistern" sollen die Verhandler ein gemeinsames Buch führen, auf was sie sich verständigen können und konnten, denn aus diesem gemeinsamen Buch erwächst der Druck, auch die Sündenregister zivil abzuarbeiten.

4. "Mit wem überhaupt kann man noch reden?" Wenn man auf der "anderen Seite" keinen mehr findet, den man mag oder der ausreichend legitimiert ist, dann bleibt einem nichts anderes übrig, als mit denen zu reden, die man nicht mag.

-markus rabanus-

Friedensvertrag zw. Ägypten und Israel

PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT
March 26, 1979

Text: The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel;

PREAMBLE

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict in all its aspects;

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel";


Article I


The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I ), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).

Article II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel in the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.


Article III


The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;
They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory , against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

Article IV


In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

Article V


Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations, Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non- discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Article VI


This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter in the event of a conflict between the obligation of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

Article VII


Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

Article VIII

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.


Article IX


This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.

All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.


Annex I
Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Agreements


Article I
Concept of Withdrawal


Israel will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

To ensure the mutual security of the Parties, the implementation of phased withdrawal will be accompanied by the military measures and establishment of zones set out in this Annex and in Map 1, hereinafter referred to as "the Zones."

The withdrawal from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases:

The interim withdrawal behind the line from east of El-Arish to Ras Mohammed as delineated on Map 2 within nine months from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind the international boundary not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

A Joint Commission will be formed immediately after the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty in order to supervise and coordinate movements and schedules during the withdrawal, and to adjust plans and timetables as necessary within the limits established by paragraph 3, above. Details relating to the Joint Commission are set out in Article IV of the attached Appendix. The Joint Commission will be dissolved upon completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

Article II
Determination of Final Lines and Zones


In order to provide maximum security for both Parties after the final withdrawal, the lines and the Zones delineated on Map 1 are to be established and organized as follows:

Zone A

Zone A is bounded on the east by line A (red line) and on the west by the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, as shown on Map 1.
An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division and its military installations, and field fortifications, will be in this Zone.
The main elements of that Division will consist of:

Three mechanized infantry brigades.
One armed brigade.
Seven field artillery battalions including up to 126 artillery pieces.
Seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual surface-to-air missiles and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and above.
Up to 230 tanks.
Up to 480 armored personnel vehicles of all types.
Up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel.

Zone B

Zone B is bounded by line B (green line) on the east and by line A (red line) on the west, as shown on Map 1.
Egyptian border units of four battalions equipped with light weapons and wheeled vehicles will provide security and supplement the civil police in maintaining order in Zone B. The main elements in the four Border Battalions will consist of up to a total of four thousand personnel.
Land based, short range, low power, coastal warning points of the border patrol units may be established on the coast of this Zone.
There will be in Zone B field fortifications and military installations for the four border battalions.

Zone C

Zone C is bounded by line B (green line) on the west and the International Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east, as shown on Map 1.
Only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police will be stationed in Zone C.
The Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this Zone.
The United Nations Force will be deployed within Zone C and perform its functions as defined in Article VI of this annex.
The United Nations Force will be stationed mainly in camps located within the following stationing areas shown on Map 1, and will establish its precise locations after consultations with Egypt:

In that part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 Km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the International Boundary.
In the Sharm el Sheikh area.

Zone D

Zone D is bounded by line D (blue line) on the east and the international boundary on the west, as shown on Map 1.
In this Zone there will be an Israeli limited force of four infantry battalions, their military installations, and field fortifications, and United Nations observers.
The Israeli forces in Zone D will not include tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft missiles except individual surface-to-air missiles.
The main elements of the four Israeli infantry battalions will consist of up to 180 armored personnel vehicles of all types and up to a total of four thousand personnel.

Access across the international boundary shall only be permitted through entry check points designated by each Party and under its control. Such access shall be in accordance with laws and regulations of each country.

Only those field fortifications, military installations, forces, and weapons specifically permitted by this Annex shall be in the Zones.

Article III
Aerial Military Regime


Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaissance flights of Egypt and Israel shall take place only over Zones A and D, respectively.

Only unarmed, non-combat aircraft of Egypt and Israel will be stationed in Zones A and D, respectively.

Only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft will take off and land in Zone B and up to eight such aircraft may be maintained in Zone B. The Egyptian border unit.,., may be equipped with unarmed helicopters to perform their functions in Zone B.

The Egyptian civil police may be equipped with unarmed police helicopters to perform normal police functions in Zone C.

Only civilian airfields maybe built in the Zones.

Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those military aerial activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and the airspace above their territorial waters.

Article IV
Naval Regime


Egypt and Israel may base and operate naval vessels along the coasts of Zones A and D, respectively.

Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may be stationed and operate in the territorial waters of Zone B to assist the border units in performing their functions in this Zone.

Egyptian civil police equipped with light boats, lightly armed, shall perform normal police functions within the territorial waters of Zone C.

Nothing in this Annex shall be considered as derogating from the right of innocent passage of the naval vessels of either party.

Only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the Zones.

Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those naval activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and in their territorial waters.

Article V
Early Warning Systems

Egypt and Israel may establish and operate early warning systems only in Zones A and D respectively.


Article VI
United Nations Operations


The Parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the implementation of this Annex and employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.

With respect to these United Nations forces and observers, as appropriate, the Parties agree to request the following arrangements:

Operation of check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C.
Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of this Annex will be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party.
Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace.

The arrangements described in this article for each zone will be implemented in ones A, B, and C by the United Nations Force and in Zone D by the United Nations Observers.

United Nations verification teams shall be accompanied by liaison officers of the respective Party.

The United Nations Force and observers will report their findings to both Parties.

The United Nations Force and Observers operating in the Zones will enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance of their tasks.

The United Nations Force and Observers are not empowered to authorize the crossing of the international boundary.

The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations Force and Observers will be drawn. They "ill be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The Parties agree that the United Nations should make those command arrangements that will best assure the effective implementation of its responsibilities.

Article VII
Liaison System


Upon dissolution of the Joint Commission, a liaison system between the Parties will be established. This liaison system is intended to provide an effective method to assess progress in the implementation of obligations under the present Annex and to resolve any problem that may arise in the course of implementation, and refer other unresolved matters to the higher military authorities of the two countries respectively for consideration. It is also intended to prevent situations resulting from errors or misinterpretation on the part of either Party.

An Egyptian liaison office will be established in the city of El-Arish and an Israeli liaison office will be established in the city of Beer-Sheba. Each office will be headed by an officer of the respective country, and assisted by a number of officers.

A direct telephone link between the two offices will be set up and also direct telephone lines with the United Nations command will be maintained by both offices.

Article VIII
Respect for War Memorials

Each Party undertakes to preserve in good condition the War Memorials erected in the memory of soldiers of the other Party, namely those erected by Egypt in Israel, and shall permit access to such monuments.


Article IX
Interim Arrangements

The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians behind the interim withdrawal line, and the conduct of the forces of the Parties and the United Nations prior to the final withdrawal, will be governed by the attached Appendix and Map 2.



Appendix to Annex I
Organization of Movements in the Sinai


Article I
Principles of Withdrawal


The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases as described in Article I of Annex I. The description and timing of the withdrawal are included in this Appendix. The Joint Commission will develop and present to the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations forces in the Middle East the details of these phases not later than one month before the initiation of each phase of withdrawal.

Both parties agree on the following principles for the sequences of military movements.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 2, of this Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete withdrawal from the current J and M Lines established by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Agreement, up to the interim withdrawal line, all military arrangements existing under that Agreement will remain in effect, except those military arrangements otherwise provided for in this Appendix.
As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations forces will immediately enter the evacuated areas to establish interim and temporary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for the purpose of maintaining a separation of forces. United Nations forces' deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel into these areas.
Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zone A, units of Egyptian armed forces shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.
Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zones A or B, Egyptian border units shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix, and will function in accordance with the provisions of Article II of Annex I.
Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated areas immediately after the United Nations forces to perform normal police functions.
Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.
Except those movements mentioned above, deployments of Egyptian armed forces and the activities covered in Annex I will be offered in the evacuated areas when Israeli armed forces have completed their withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.

Article II
Subphases of the Withdrawal to the Interim Withdrawal Line


The withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line will be accomplished in subphases as described in this Article and as shown on Map 3. Each subphase will be completed within the indicated number of months from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty:

First subphase: within two months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Arish, including the town of El Arish and its airfield, shown as Area I on Map 3.
Second subphase: within three months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area between line M of the 1975 Agreement and line A, shown as Area II on Map 3.
Third subphase: within five months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area east and south of Area II, shown as Area III on Map 3.
Fourth subphase: within seven months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Tor- Ras El Kenisa, shown as Area IV on Map 3.
Fifth subphase: Within nine months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the remaining areas west of the interim withdrawal line, including the areas of Santa Katrina and the areas east of the Giddi and Mitla passes, shown as Area V on Map 3, thereby completing Israeli withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.

Egyptian forces will deploy in the areas evacuated by Israeli armed forces as follows:

Up to one-third of the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai in accordance with the 1975 Agreement will deploy in the portions of Zone A lying within Area I, until the completion of interim withdrawal. Thereafter, Egyptian armed forces as described Article II of Annex I will be deployed in Zone A up to the limits of the interim zone.
The Egyptian naval activity in accordance with Article IV of Annex I will commence along the coasts of areas I, III and IV, upon completion of the second, third, and fourth subphases, respectively.
Of the Egyptian border units described in Article II of Annex I, upon completion of the first subphase one battalion will be deployed in Area I. A second battalion will deployed in Area II upon completion of the second subphase. A third battalion will deployed in Area Ill upon completion of the third subphase. The second and third battalions mentioned above may also be deployed in any of the subsequently evacuated areas of the southern Sinai.

United Nations forces in Buffer Zone I of the 1976 Agreement will redeploy enable the deployment of Egyptian forces described above upon the completion of the subphase, but will otherwise continue to function in accordance with the provisions of that Agreement in the remainder of that zone until the completion of interim withdrawal, as indicated in Article I of this Appendix.

Israeli convoys may use the roads south and east of the main road junction east of El Arish to evacuate Israeli forces up to the completion of interim withdrawal. These convoys will proceed in daylight upon four hours notice to the Egyptian liaison group and United Nations forces, will be escorted by United Nations forces, and will be in accordance with schedules coordinated by the Joint Commission. An Egyptian liaison officer will accompany convoys to assure uninterrupted movement. The Joint Commission may approve other arrangements for convoys.

Article III
United Nations Forces


The Parties shall request that United Nations forces be deployed as necessary to perform the functions described in the Appendix up to the time of completion of final Israeli withdrawal. For that purpose, the Parties agree to the redeployment of the United Nations Emergency Force.

United Nations forces will supervise the implementation of this Appendix and will employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.

When United Nations forces deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article and II of this Appendix, they will perform the functions of verification in limited force zones in accordance with Article VI of Annex I, and will establish check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts in the temporary buffer zones described in Article II above. Other functions of the United Nations forces which concern the interim buffer zone are described in Article V of this Appendix.

Article IV
Joint Commission and Liaison


The Joint Commission referred to in Article IV of this Treaty will function from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty up to the date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

The Joint Commission will be composed of representatives of each Party headed by senior officers. This Commission shall invite a representative of the United Nations when discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, or when either Party requests United Nations presence. Decisions of the Joint Commission will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.

The Joint Commission will supervise the implementation of the arrangements described in Annex I and this Appendix. To this end, and by agreement of both Parties, it will:

coordinate military movements described in this Appendix and supervise their implementation;
address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the implementation of Annex I and this Appendix, and discuss any violations reported by the United Nations Force and Observers and refer to the Governments of Egypt and Israel any unresolved problems;
assist the United Nations Force and Observers in the execution of their mandates, and deal with the timetables of the periodic verification when referred to it by the Parties as provided for in Annex I and this Appendix;
organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all lines and zones described in Annex I and this Appendix;
supervise the handing over of the main installations in the Sinai from Israel to Egypt;
agree on necessary arrangements for finding and returning missing bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers;
organize the setting up and operation of entry check points along the El Arish-Ras Mohammed line in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of Annex III;
conduct its operations through the use of joint liaison teams consisting of one Israeli representative and one Egyptian representative, provided from a standing Liaison Group, which will conduct activities as directed by the Joint Commission;
provide liaison and coordination to the United Nations command implementing provisions of the Treaty, and, through the joint liaison teams, maintain local coordination and cooperation with the United Nations Force stationed in specific areas or United Nations Observers monitoring specific areas for any assistance as needed;
discuss any other matters which the Parties by agreement may place before it.

Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be held at least once a month. In the event that either Party of the Command of the United Nations Force requests a specific meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.

The Joint Committee will meet in the buffer zone until the completion of the interim withdrawal and in El Arish and Beer-Sheba alternately afterwards. The first meeting will be held not later than two weeks after the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article V
Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone and Its Activities


An interim buffer zone, by which the United Nations Force will effect a separation of Egyptian and Israeli elements, will be established west of and adjacent to the interim withdrawal line as shown on Map 2 after implementation of Israeli withdrawal and deployment behind the interim withdrawal line. Egyptian civil police equipped with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this zone.

The United Nations Force will operate check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts within the interim buffer zone in order to ensure compliance with the terms of this Article.

In accordance with arrangements agreed upon by both Parties and to be coordinated by the Joint Commission, Israeli personnel will operate military technical installations at four specific locations shown on Map 2 and designated as T1 (map central coordinate 57163940), T2 (map central coordinate 59351541), T3 (map central coordinate 5933-1527), and T4 (map central coordinate 61130979) under the following principles:

The technical installations shall be manned by technical and administrative personnel equipped with small arms required for their protection (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades, and ammunition), as follows:

T1 - up to 150 personnel
T2 and T3 - up to 350 personnel
T4 - up to 200 personnel

Israeli personnel will not carry weapons outside the sites, except officers who may carry personal weapons.

Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and Israel will enter and conduct inspections within the perimeters of technical installations in the buffer zone. The third party will conduct inspections in a random manner at least once a month. The inspections will verify the nature of the operation of the installations and the weapons and personnel therein. The third party will immediately report to the Parties any divergence from an installation's visual and electronic surveillance or communications role.

Supply of the installations, visits for technical and administrative purposes, and replacement of personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may occur uninterruptedly from the United Nations check points to the perimeter of the technical installations, after checking and being escorted by only the United Nations forces.

Israel will be permitted to introduce into its technical installations items required for the proper functioning of the installations and personnel.

As determined by the Joint Commission, Israel will be permitted to:

Maintain in its installations fire-fighting and general maintenance equipment as well as wheeled administrative vehicles and mobile engineering equipment necessary for the maintenance of the sites. All vehicles shall be unarmed.
Within the sites and in the buffer zone, maintain roads, water lines, and communications cables which serve the site. At each of the three installation locations (T1, T2 and T3, and T4), this maintenance may be performed with up to two unarmed wheeled vehicles and by up to twelve unarmed personnel with only necessary equipment, including heavy engineering equipment if needed. This maintenance may be performed three times a week, except for special problems, and only after giving the United Nations four hours notice. The teams will be escorted by the United Nations.

Movement to and from the technical installations will take place only during daylight hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical installations shall be as follows:

T1: Through a United Nations check point, and via the road between Abu Aweigila and the intersection of the Abu Aweigila road and the Gebel Libni road (at Km. 161), as shown on Map 2.
T2 and T3: through a United Nations checkpoint and via the road constructed across the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as shown on Map 2.
T2, T3, and T4: via helicopters flying within a corridor at the times, and according to a flight profile, agreed to by the Joint Commission. The helicopters will be checked by the United Nations Force at landing sites outside the perimeter of the installations.

Israel will inform the United Nations Force at least one hour in advance of each intended movement to and from the installations.

Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and wounded and summon medical experts and medical teams at any time after giving immediate notice to the United Nations Force.

The details of the above principles and all other matters in this Article requiring coordination by the Parties will be handled by the Joint Commission.

These technical installations will be withdrawn when Israeli forces withdraw from the interim withdrawal line, or at a time agreed by the parties.

Article VI
Disposition of Installations and Military Barriers

Disposition of installations and military barriers will be determined by the Parties in accordance with the following guidelines:


Up to three weeks before Israeli withdrawal from any area, the Joint Commission will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical teams to conduct a joint inspection of all appropriate installations to agree upon condition of structures and articles which will be transferred to Egyptian control and to arrange for such transfer. Israel will declare, at that time, its plans for disposition of installations and articles within the installations.

Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all agreed infrastructures, utilities, and installations intact, inter alia, airfields, roads, pumping stations, and ports. Israel will present to Egypt the information necessary for the maintenance and operation of the facilities. Egyptian technical teams will be permitted to observe and familiarize themselves with the operation of these facilities for a period of up to two weeks prior to transfer.

When Israel relinquishes Israeli military water points near El Arish and El Tor, Egyptian technical teams will assume control of those installations and ancillary equipment in accordance with an orderly transfer process arranged beforehand by the Joint Commission. Egypt undertakes to continue to make available at all water supply points the normal quantity of currently available water up to the time Israel withdraws behind the international boundary, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Commission.

Israel will make its best effort to remove or destroy all military barriers, including obstacles and minefields, in the areas and adjacent waters from which it withdraws, according to the following concept:

Military barriers will be cleared first from areas near populations, roads and major installations and utilities.
For those obstacles and minefields which cannot be removed or destroyed prior to Israeli withdrawal, Israel will provide detailed maps to Egypt and the United Nations through the Joint Commission not later than 15 days before entry of United Nations forces into the affected areas.

Egyptian engineers will enter those areas after United Nations forces enter to conduct barrier clearance operations in accordance with Egyptian plans to be submitted prior to implementation.

Article VII
Surveillance Activities


Aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried out as follows:

Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal.
Flight profiles will cover the Limited Forces Zones to monitor the limitations on forces and armaments, and to determine that Israeli armed forces have withdrawn from the areas described in Article II of Annex I, Article II of this Appendix, and Maps 2 and 3, and that these forces thereafter remain behind their lines. Special inspection flights may be flown at the request of either Party or of the United Nations.
Only the main elements in the military organizations of each Party, as described in Annex I and in this Appendix, will be reported.

Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission to continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission be terminated.

Article VIII
Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty

Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated parts of the Sinai upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Article I of this Treaty.


ANNEX II

Map of Israel-Egypt International Boundary

ANNEX III

Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties


Article 1
Diplomatic and Consular Relations

The Parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal.


Article 2
Economic and Trade Relations


The Parties agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations and to terminate economic boycotts of each other upon completion of the interim withdrawal.

As soon as possible, and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties will enter negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on trade and commerce for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations.

Article 3
Cultural Relations


The Parties agree to establish normal cultural relations following completion of the interim withdrawal.

They agree on the desirability of cultural exchanges in all fields, and shall, as soon as possible and not later than six months after completion of the interim withdrawal, enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a cultural agreement for this purpose.

Article 4
Freedom of Movement


Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party will permit the free movement of the nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither Party will impose discriminatory restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.

Mutual unimpeded access to places of religious and historical significance will be provided on a non- discriminatory basis.

Article 5
Cooperation for Development and Good Neighborly Relations


The Parties recognize a mutuality of interest in good neighbourly relations and agree to consider means to promote such relations.

The Parties will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in their region. Each agrees to consider proposals the other may wish to make to this end.

The Parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other.

Article 6
Transportation and Telecommunications


The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944 ("The Chicago Convention") and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, 1944.

Upon completion of the interim withdrawal any declaration of national emergency by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other party on a discriminatory basis.

Egypt agrees that the use of airfields left by Israel near El-Arish, Rafah, Ras El-Nagb and Sharm El- Sheikh shall be for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations.

As soon as possible and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties shall enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a civil aviation agreement.

The Parties will reopen and maintain roads and railways between their countries and will consider further road and rail links. The Parties further agree that a highway will be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage of persons, vehicles and goods between Egypt and Jordan, without prejudice to their sovereignty over that part of the highway which falls within their respective territory.

Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, normal postal, telephone, telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite shall be established between the two Parties in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations.

Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party shall grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other. Such access will be granted on the same conditions generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations. Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace will be implemented upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the aforementioned treaty.

Article 7
Enjoyment of Human Rights

The Parties affirm their commitment to respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and they will promote these rights and freedoms in accordance with the United Nations Charter.


Article 8
Territorial Seas

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace each Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial sea in accordance with the rules of international law.



AGREED MINUTES


Article I

Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in paragraph 2 of Article I shall occur with regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from the area.

Article IV

It is agreed between the parties that the review provided for in Article IV (4) will be undertaken when requested by either party, commencing within three months of such a request, but that any amendment can be made only by mutual agreement of both parties.

Article V

The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows: "The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."

Article VI (2)

The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI (2) of the Treaty, which reads as follows: "The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action of any other Party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty."

Article VI (5)

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI (5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows: "Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligation under this Treaty will be binding and implemented."

Annex I

Article VI, Paragraph 8, of Annex I provides as follows:

"The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations forces and observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council."

The Parties have agreed as follows:

"With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of Annex 1, if no agreement is reached between the Parties, they will accept or support a U.S. proposal concerning the composition of the United Nations force and observers."


Annex III

The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance herewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel, on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil.

For the Government
of Israel

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter
President of the United States of America

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:


The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.

Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza


Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel


Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.

n order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.


C. Associated Principles


Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

full recognition;

abolishing economic boycotts;

guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies an actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

For the Government of Israel:
Menachem Begin

For the Government of
the Arab Republic of Egypt
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

Witnessed by
Jimmy Carter,
President of the United States of America


Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty
between Egypt and Israel


In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

It is agreed that:


The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:


the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;

the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;

the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces
No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).

In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed:


in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and

in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.


Interim Withdrawal
Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of
the Arab Republic of Egypt:
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

For the Government of Israel:
Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter,
President of the United States of America

Resolution 338 vom 22.10.1973

U.N. Security Council Resolution 338
October 22, 1973

The Security Council met on 21 October at the urgent request of both the US and the USSR, and by 14 votes to none, adopted the following resolution:

The Security Council,

Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Resolution 242 v. 22.11.1967

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242
November 22, 1967

The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,


Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

Affirms further the necessity

For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.